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In today's society, many people share their deepest secrets and personal
thoughts on Facebook and other social media sites. Most believe that they are
only sharing with a private few,2 but what happens when nearly everyone in a
person's life is on Facebook? In his Time article on the "2010 Person of the
Year," Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg, Lev Grossman eerily predicted:
The bigger social networks get, the more pressure there is on
everybody else to join them, which means that they tend to pick up
speed as they grow, and to grow until they saturate their markets. It's
going to get harder and harder to say no to Facebook and to the
authentically wonderful things it brings, and the authentically awful
things too.
It seems the only mistake George Orwell made was in supposing that "Big
Brother" would have to take our freedom from us against our will.4 Facebook
believes we will hand it over willingly. If we all entrust our information,
thoughts, and personal data to social networking companies and other
information hungry Internet sites, we will be sharing not only with our friends
but also with our foes.

1. See Geoffrey A. Fowler, When the Most PersonalSecrets Get Outed on Facebook. WALL
ST. J., Oct. 13-14, 2012, at Al.
2.

See id.

3. Lev Grossman. 2010 Person of the Year: Mark Zuckerberg, TIME, Dec. 27, 2010, at 44,
75. Lev Grossman wrote a subsequent article on whether he was right about Facebook's bright
future. See Lev Grossman, WTith Facebook at a Crossroads. Is Mark Zuckerberg's Future Still
Bright?, TIME IDEAS (May 18, 2012), http://ideas.time.com/2012/05/18 /is-mark-zuckerbergs-futurestill-bright/. The article mentions that people are starting to want to "desocialize" and get back their
privacy. See id
4.
George Orwell is an English author, well known for his novel Nineteen Eighty-four (titled
1984 in later collections).
See George Oriell, BIOGRAPHY, http://www.biography.com/
people/george-orwell-9429833 (last visited Feb. 10. 2013). Nineteen Eighty-four presents a bleak
vision of the world, divided into three oppressive nations. Id. In the novel, Orwell imagined a
world in which the governent controlled every detail of a person's life, down to his private
thoughts. See id. "Big Brother" is the face of the oppressive political party, symbolizing the
vagueness of authority's power and its inescapable presence. See GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN
EIGHTY-FOUR (1949).
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Many consumers do not realize that the information stored on Facebook's
servers or iCloud is available to third parties.5 They only vaguely understand
that by using Google Maps on their iPhones, they are revealing their location to a
third party,6 or that by using the Internet, they are downloading corporate digital
spies in the form of cookies and beacons. Because consumers do not grasp how
vulnerable their information is, few have taken measures to safeguard their
information.8 Consumers do not realize they should attempt to bargain for
privacy, rather than simply giving it away. 9 Unfortunately, however, consumers
have little to no bargaining power with large companies like Apple or Google.10
Therefore, courts, legislators, and rulemakers should step in to protect consumers
from unwanted privacy intrusions, specifically through discovery in litigation.
Consumers are not the only ones who should be concerned, however.
Corporations are now using cloud storage to store their electronic records.I
Companies can enter into a contract with a third-party storage company and then
house their documents, some of which are highly confidential, on the thirdparty's servers for a price.
Companies avoid the cost of purchasing and
maintaining their own servers, and they save money by agreeing to pay only for
the amount of storage used.
Individuals who use the cloud can carry
lightweight, high-performance tablets and phones that are not bogged down with
heavy storage capacity.1 But there is a catch: customers must hand over custody

5.
See Data Use Policy, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/policy.php (last updated
Dec. 11, 2012); iCloud Terms and Conditions, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/legal'icloud/en/
terms.html (last revised Sept. 13, 2012).
6. See Privacy Policy GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/int/en/policies/privacy/ (last
modified July 27, 2012).
7.
See generally id. (discussing how Google uses cookies to collect and store information).
8.
See generally Cookies: Leaving a Trail on the Web. ONGUARD ONLINE, http://www.
onguardonline. gov/articles/0042-cookies-leaving-trail-web (last visited Jan. 22, 2013) (describing
methods of safeguarding online information).
9. The Obama Administration has recognized American Internet users' right to privacy and
has unveiled a "Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights." Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet:
Plan to Protect Privacy in the Internet Age by Adopting a Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights (Feb. 23,
2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/02/23/fact-sheet-plan-protectprivacy-interniet-age-adopting-consumer-privacy -b. The Bill of Rights is based on the premise that
"American Internet users should have the right to control personal information about themselves."
Id.
10. See Wayne R. Barnes, Social Media and the Rise in Consumer Bargaining Power. 14 U.
PA. J. Bus. L. 661, 661 (2012).
11. See EPCA Refbrm and the Revolution in Cloud Computing: Hearing Before the
Subconn. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, & Civil Liberties of the Comm. on the JudiciaryH.R.,
111th Cong. 14 (2010) [hereinafter Hearing] (prepared statement of Edward W. Felten, Professor of
Computer Science and Public Affairs, Princeton University); Francoise Gilbert, Cloud Service
ContractsMay Be Fluft: Selected Legal Issues to Consider Before Taking of, J. INTERNET L., Dec.
2010, at 1, 1.
12. See Hearing,supra note 11. at 14; Gilbert, supra note 11, at 1.
13. See Hearing,supra note II, at 14; Gilbert, supra note II, at 1.
14. See id.
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of their precious data.1 What happens when a third-party data storage company
receives a subpoena or an investigatory demand? Worse yet, what happens if a
consumer has intentionally or unintentionally agreed to allow the cloud provider
unlimited access to his information through the data storage contract?
Whether it is due to consumers' increasing demand for lightweight and
affordable high-performance mobile devices, companies' hesitancy to invest in
their own expensive servers, consumers' desire for the flexibility of web-based
email, such as Gmail or Yahoo! mail, or powerful corporations' unwillingness to
store and dole out data for profit unless we grant them access to our valuable
personal information in return, there is no dispute that, as a country, we are
bleeding personal data. We bleed data by saving our emails, correspondence,
records, songs, and books on other people's computers. Consumers are giving
their information to third parties because it is convenient and cheap to have
someone else carry their pile of papers.
Some consumers do not even realize they are forfeiting their personal
information. 16 Many fail to question where those emails in their Gmail inbox or
photos on their Facebook page actually reside.
In the rush to embrace every
new piece of hardware and software, people do not consider the unintended
consequences-some legal, some practical. Although there may be benefits to
allowing Google, Microsoft, or some entrepreneurial storage company to bear
the burden and cost of buying the "big iron" (servers as far as the eye can see),19
most consumers have not paused to consider what might happen after they hand
over their data. 20
If, as a country, we are going to allow third parties to gather, store, and even
broker our personal information and documents for a profit, then the law must
adapt to protect both individuals and businesses from completely losing their
rights to privacy.

15. See generally Alberto G. Araiza, Note, Electronic Discovery in the Cloud DUKE L. &
TECH. REv., no. 8, 2011, at 1, 14 ("Cloud providers are custodians of the ESI they hold in data
centers.").
16. See, e.g., Daniel J. Gervais & Daniel J. Hyndman, Cloud Control: Copyright, Global
Mlenes and Privacy, 10 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 53, 78-79 (2012) ("The. . average users
do not know how personal information is used after it enters the Cloud .... ).
17. See generally id. at 76 77 (posing questions about what happens to information entered
online that the average consumer does not consider).
18. See id. at 78-80 (describing both legal and practical consequences of sharing personal
information in clouds).
19. "Big Iron" has been described as "high-priced products characterized by heavy-duty
packaging, complex interconnections, large scalabi lity, and a multitude of software features such as
de-duplication and compression" and is knowi for doing "its main job well, no question; data rarely
gets misplaced."
Jim O'Reilly, The White-Box Threat to Big Iron Storage, DATACENTER
ACCELERATION (Oct. 16, 2012). http://wwN.datacenteracceleration.com/author.asp'section-id=
2559&doc id=252489.
20. See, e.g., Gervais & Hyndman, supra note 16, at 78-79 ("The ... average users do not
know how personal information is used after it enters the Cloud . . . .").
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At their best, those who govern use the rule of law to protect those who
cannot protect themselves, to check unchecked power, and to protect our
fundamental rights.) The fundamental right of privacy is currently under attack.
Ordinary citizens seem to be left with no choice but to feed the ever-growing
data stream of contemporary commerce and give up any remnants of privacy, all
in exchange for an ever-shrinking piece of the pie. If you want a mobile phone,
then the mobile phone provider may own the content of your calls. If you want
to store information on the cloud, then the storage company can read and maybe
even sell your personal information. 72 If you want to use a debit card, then the
bank can store and sell your buying patterns. If you want to use the Internet,
then each click or scroll is tracked and compiled by strangers.25 Finally, if the
government wants all of the information you have given to Apple and Google
and sent to the cloud, they can have it.26
This is not the future; this is today. Courts and lawmakers must overcome
their Luddite ways and step forward to protect the fundamental right of privacy
before it is lost through unconscionable consumer contracts and constant
unscrupulous data-mining.
This Article will discuss how we are already bleeding personal data.
Specifically, Part IT explores how individual consumers share their personal data
knowingly and unknowingly through social networking sites like Facebook and
web-based service providers like Google. It analyzes how both businesses and
consumers also share the contents of their computers and digital devices by
agreeing to use cloud storage. Furthermore, it discusses how we are constantly
sharing data about ourselves and our whereabouts through mobile phones and
personal Global Positioning System (GPS) devices.
Part III of this Article suggests that if we are to cede our right of privacy to
the marketing companies and data miners, we may unwittingly lose our right to
protect ourselves from unwanted government intrusion. Because the current
laws do not create or protect a comprehensive or coherent right to privacy, Part
IV argues for lawmaker intervention to protect United States citizens from losing
their right to privacy in life and in the courtroom. Specifically, Part IV argues

21. See Barnali Choudhury, Recapturing Public Power: Is Investment Arbitration's
Engageient of the Public Interest Contributing to the Democratic Defecit?, 41 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 775, 783 (2008) (citing Paul B. Stephan, Accountability and hIternational
Law making: Rules, Rents and Legitimacy, 17 Nw J. INT' LL. & Bus. 681, 684 (1997)).
2)2. See, e.g., Eric Lichtblau. More Demands on Cell Carriers in Surveillance, N.Y. TIvEs,
July 9, 2012, at AI (describing how cell carriers turn over upon request "text messages, caller

locations and other information").
23. See, e.g.. iCloud Terns and Conditions, supra note 5 ("You [the user] further consent and
agree that Apple may collect, use, transmit, process and maintain information related to your
Account .7... ).
24. See Blake Ellis, The Banks' Billion-DollarIdea, CNNMONEY (July 8, 2011, 5:15 PM)
http://money.cnn.con/2011/07/06/pf banks sell shopping datalindex.htm.
25. See Privacy Policy, supra note 6.
26. See Privacy Policy, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/privacy/ (last updated May 21, 2012);
Privacy Policy, supra note 6.
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that the Stored Communications Act is ineffective and should be amended or
replaced.
I will conclude with two rational solutions: First, for Congress to pass a
comprehensive privacy statute, similar to the 2011 bill Senator McCain and thenSenator Kerry proposed to define our privacy rights. Second. the Judicial
Conference of the United States, through amendments to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 26 and 45, should implement a contemporary discovery rule
safeguarding private information in litigation.
II. WE ARE ALREADY BLEEDING PERSONAL DATA
Acclaimed social-data expert, Andreas Weigend, Ph.D., recently stated,
"Now, many of us reveal on Facebook what the KGB couldn't get out of us with
torture." 27 Individuals are sharing that data with one another with greater and
greater frequency. Thus, before analyzing a legal framework for contemporary
privacy, it makes sense to first understand the types of personal data being
created and how individuals and corporations are sharing that data.
A.

Individual Consumers Share Their Personal Data Knowinglv and
Unknowingly Through Social Networking Sites like Facebook and WP'ebBased Service Providers like Google

Today, individuals commonly share data about themselves through the
various services and applications of social networking and Internet productivity
sites, like Facebook and Google.29 Because people voluntarily sign tip for these
services and intentionally decide what to share and with whom, it would seem
that Facebook and other similar sites should not be a threat to privacy. However,
due to Facebook's misleading privacy settings and ever-changing privacy policy,
its customers are often confused about what they are actually sharing and exactly
with whom they are sharing it.so
This problem has reached epic proportions. Recently, the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) threatened an enforcement action against Facebook, which
Facebook, in turn, agreed to settle. 3 Negotiations began in November 2011

27. Stephanie Susman, #WI10: Andreas WIeigend on Mfarketing and Wieb 2.0, FLEISHMANHILLARD INNOVATION (June 24, 2010), http://innovation.fleishmanhillard.com/index.php/2010/
06/24/wifl0-anidreas-weigend-on-marketing-and-web-2-0/ (internal quotation marks omitted).
28. See, e.g, Consumer Reports Survey: 52 Percent of Social Network Users Post Risky
Information, PRNEWSWIRE (May 4, 2010), http: /wwv.prnewswire.cominews-releases/consumer-reportssurvey -52-percent-of-social-netw ork-users-post-risky -information-92748 3 44.html ("The number of
online U.S. households using social networks ... has nearly doubled in the past year
").
29. See id.
30. See, e.g., Fowler, supra note 1 (describing two Facebook users as "casualties of a privacy
loophole").
31. See Julia Angwin et al., Facebook Retreats on Privacy, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 2011, at
Al; Claire Cain Miller, F. TC. Said to Be Near Facebook Privacy Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. I I, 2011 ,
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and culminated in an August 2012 settlement. 33 The FTC required Facebook to
create a "comprehensive privacy policy" and prohibited it from making any
changes that would overrule a user's personal privacy preferences. The FTC's
decision does not bar Facebook from creating a personal privacy policy that
allows it to use its customers' personal data; it only requires that Facebook be
transparent and consistent. Thus, this decision promises to be no more than the
opening salvo over Facebook's bow.
Likewise, Google reached a compromise with the FTC tinder a similar threat
of an enforcement action.
As a result, Google revised its privacy policy and
consolidated over sixty disjointed policies into one.3 The synthesized policy,
effective March 1, 2012, reveals that Google has no interest in maintaining
consumer privacy. The new policy may be easier to read and understand,39 but
the message Google sends is frightening: if you use Google, then Google owns
your information and will use it how they see fit and profitable. 40 Both the
director of the FTC and over half of the state attorney generals are highly critical
of Google's new policy.4
The FTC's criticism was validated. On August 8, 2012, the FTC charged
42
Google with misrepresenting privacy features.
Google settled the case for
$22.5 million.4 Jon Leibowitz, Chairman of the FTC, commented,

at B3: News Release. Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Approves Final Settlement with Facebook (Aug. 10,
2012), available at http://ftc.goviopa/2012/08/facebook.shtm, Hayley Tsukayama, Facebook AO:
Privacv Settlement Reached with FTC, WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 2011, http://articles.washington
post.coni/2011-11-29/business/35283313 1_privacy-audits-privacy -settlement-user-consent.
32. News Release. Fed. Trade Comm'n, Facebook Settles FTC Charges That It Deceived
Consumers by Failing to Keep Privacy Promises (Nov. 29, 2011), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
opa/201 1/1 1/privacysettlement.shtm.
33. See News Release. Fed. Trade Comm'n. supranote 31.
34. See Facebook Inc., File No. 092 3184 (F.T.C. Nov. 29, 2011). http://www.fic.gov/os/
caselist/0923184/index.shtn.
35. See Angwin et al., supra note 31: Tsukayama, supra note 31.
36. See Angwin et al., supra note 31.
37. See Updating Our Privacy Policies and Termns of Service, OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG (Jan.
24, 2012), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2012/01/updating-our-privacy-policies-anid-terms.html.
On July 27, 2012, Google updated its privacy policy again. See Privacy Policy, supra note 6.
However, there were no material changes. See Privacy Policy, GOOGLE, http://Www.google.coin/
intl/en/policies/privacy/archive/20120301-20120727/ (last modified Mar. 1, 2012) (comparing the
previous March policy to the July policy).
38. See Privacy Policy, supra note 37.
39. See Alma Whitten, Google's New; Privacy Policy, GOOGLE OFFICIAL BLOG (Mar. 1,
2012), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2012/02/googles-new-privacy-policy.htn1.
40. See generally Privacy Policy, supra note 6 (giving examples of how Google might use
users' information).
41. See Mike Fossum, FTC Calls Google's New; Privacy Policy Brutal, WEBPRONEWS (Feb.
28, 2012), http://www.webpronews.com/ftc-calls-googles-new-privacy-policy-brutal-2012-02.
42. See News Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n. Google Will Pay $22.5 Million to Settle FTC
Charges It Misrepresented Privacy Assurances to Users of Apple's Safari Internet Browser (Aug. 9,
2012), available at http://ftc.govopa"/2012/08/google.shtm.
43. Id.
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The record setting penalty in this matter sends a clear message to all
companies under an FTC privacy order .... No matter how big or
small, all companies must abide by FTC orders against them and keep
their privacy promises to consumers, or they will end up paying many
times what it would have cost to comply in the first place.
Google's privacy-agreement breach is a warning that despite what the black
letter privacy setting says, an entity may not be in compliance. Furthermore, the
FTC's sanction is minuscule in comparison with Google's net worth .
The
FTC's efforts at cutting back against Big Brother may be a needle prick in a
giant's side.
Yet, despite the abundance of privacy breaches, millions of people continue
to share information voluntarily with third-party information brokers, including
Facebook, Google, Yahoo!, and Twitter.46 These third parties are not keeping
this data private; they are sharing it with others in a myriad of ways. As Mark
Zuckerberg stated in Time, "technology usually wins with these things," to
which Time followed, "And he's right: the Internet was built to move
information around, not keep it in one place, and it tends to do what it was built
to do. "48 The Internet is moving personal data around swiftly, notwithstanding
privacy settings or notions of privacy.4
In civil litigation, parties are being required to produce the contents of their
"private" Facebook pages without regard to their privacy settings.so On
November 7, 2011, a Pennsylvania court posed the question: "But what if the
people in your life want to use your Facebook posts against you in a civil
lawsuit?"51 The court then held they can.52 It ordered the plaintiff to "turn over
to Defense counsel her Facebook username email and password within 14 days

44. Id.
45. See Google Inc., Docket No. C-4336 (F.T.C. Aug. 9, 2012) (dissenting statement of
Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch), http:/ww w.fic.govios/caselist/c4336/120809googleroschstatement.pdf.
46. See generally Fowler, supra note 1 (discussing people's willingness to share information
on Facebook despite issues with user privacy).
47. See, e.g., Privacy Policv, supra note 6 (giving examples of how Google shares
information with others).
48. See Grossman, supra note 3, at 68 (internal quotation marks omitted).
49. According to Grossman, 10,000 new web sites integrate with Facebook each day,
allowing for greater access to information than ever before. See id. at 72.
50. See Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Simply Storage Mgmt., LLC, 270 F.R.D. 430,
434, 436, 437 (S.D. Ind. 2010) ("[A] person's expectation and intent that her communications be
maintained as private is not a legitimate basis for shielding those communications from discovery.");
see also Bass v. Miss Porter's Sch.. No. 3:08cv1807 (JBA), 2009 WL 3724968, at *1-2 (D. Conn. Oct.
27, 2009) (ordering plaintiff to produce for defendants an over 750-page document chronicling
Facebook activity); Ledbetter v. Wal Mart Stores, Inc., No. 06 cv 01958, 2009 WL 1067018, at *2 (D.
Colo. Apr. 21, 2009) (finding that information from Facebook and MySpace were properly within a
subpoena).
51. Largent v. Reed, No. 2009-1823. 2011 WL 5632688, slip op. at 1 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Nov.

8, 2011).
52.

See id. at 2.
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of the date of [the] Order," and to "not delete or otherwise erase any information
on her Facebook account" for thirty-five days.
The court entered this order
because the defendant had "a good faith belief that information on [plaintiffs]
Facebook profile is relevant to [defendant's] defense .... " In this opinion, the
court blows a gigantic hole through the Stored Communications portion of the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) by holding that the statute only
applies to third-party subpoenas, not direct requests to a party during civil
litigation.55

Facebook and other social networking sites are also handing over data in
criminal cases. 6 Watchdog groups have released internal Facebook documents
outlining how and when Facebook shares the "private" information on
someone's Facebook page with law enforcement.57 Facebook's law enforcement
guidelines seem to allow an ad hoc, case-by-case analysis.5 8 In its 2010 policy,
Facebook informed law enforcement that it would respond to any informal
request and potentially provide the following data about the Facebook user: User
Identification Number; Email Address; Registered Mobile Number; Profile
Contact Information; Status Update History; Shares; Notes; Wall Posting; Friend
Listing, with Friend's Facebook ID: Group Listing, with Group's Facebook ID;
Future and Past Events; and Video Listing, with filename.5
Facebook also
stated that it would share "user photos" and "[p]rivate [m]essages if retained." 60
In 2010, Facebook's law enforcement policy did not actually require any
particular criminal subpoena or warrant and simply provided that "[w]e review
each request for records individually and prioritize requests based upon case
circumstances and other factors not always obvious from the formal process."6 1
To date, no one has leaked Facebook's 2012 policy. However, Facebook
currently states on its "Information for Law Enforcement Authorities" web page
that it "will search for and disclose data that is specified with particularity in an
appropriate form of legal process and which we are reasonably able to locate and
retrieve."6 Though vague, this statement suggests that law enforcement can

53. Order of Court at 1, Largent v. Reed, No. 2009-1823 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Nov. 8, 2011).
54. Largent, No. 2009-182 3 , at 2.
55. See id. at 12 (citing Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2006)).
56.

See generally FACEBOOK, INC., FACEBOOK LAW ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES (2010)

(providing information in an internal Facebook report regarding when Facebook records will be
provided to law enforcement officers).
57. See Emil Protalinski, Leaked FacebookLaue Enfbrcement Guides Not Neuy, Already Available,
ZDNET BLOG (Nov. 24, 2011, 9:28 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/facebook/leaked-facebook-law enforcement-guides-not-new-already -available/5583 (citations omitted); see also Information for Law
Enforcement Authorities, FACEBOOK, https://vww.facebook.comisafety/groups/lawguidelines/ (last
visited Feb. 12, 2013) (providing this information to the public in response).
58.

See FACEBOOK, INC., supra note 56, at 3.

59.
60.
61.
62.

See id. at 4.
See id.
Id. at 3.
Infonmation for Laue Enforcement Authorities, supra note 57.
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access virtually anything on the Facebook servers as long as a request has been
made with some particularity and authority.
The increasing number of litigants coveting Facebook discovery has
prompted Facebook to require formal discovery procedures.
A litigant may
discover information by submitting one of three documents:
A valid subpoena issued in connection with an official criminal

investigation is required to compel the disclosure of basic subscriber
records (defined in 18 U.S.C. Section 2703(c)(2)), which may include:
name, length of service, credit card information, email address(es), and
a recent login IP address, if available.
A court order issued under 18 U.S.C. Section 2703(d) is required to
compel the disclosure of certain records or other information pertaining
to the account, not including contents of communications, which may
include message headers and IP addresses, in addition to the basic
subscriber records identified above.
A search warrant issued under the procedures described in the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or equivalent State warrant
procedures upon a showing of probable cause is required to compel the
disclosure of the stored contents of any account, which may include
messages, photos, videos, wall posts, and location information.6
In addition, Facebook "interpret[s] the national security letter provision as
applied to Facebook to require the production of only 2 categories of
information: name and length of service."
It is quite possible that it was tinder the 2010 version of this same policy that
Facebook supposedly handed over information relating to those of its users who
supported WikiLeaks and Julian Assange after Wikileaks leaked a series of
confidential U.S. State Department wire messages.66 Julian Assange and
Wikileaks accused Facebook of cooperating with the federal government, calling
Facebook "the most appalling spying machine that has ever been invented." 67
Although easily dismissed as paranoia. these accusations and Facebook's
law enforcement policy are consistent with the form contract Facebook's users
enter into when they sign up for its services. 68 Facebook states in its privacy

policy:

63.

See id.

64.

Id.

65. Id.
66. See Scott Shane & John F. Bums, Twitter Records in Wikileaks Case Are Subpoenaed,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2011, at Al.
67. WlikiLeaks'JulianAssange Says US Uses Facebook, Google to Spy, GLOBALPOST (May
4, 2011, 10:22). http://www.globalpost.com/dispatcinews/business-tecitecnology-news/ 110504/
wikileaks-julian-assange-facebook-twitter-nsa-spy-video.
68. Compare Infbrmation for Law Enfrncemeient Authorities, supra note 57, with Data Use
Policy, supra note 5 (showing the similarity between the two).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol64/iss3/8

10

Witte: Bleeding Data in a Pool of Sharks: The Anathema of Privacy in a W
2013]

BLEEDTNG DATA TN A POOL OF SHARKS

727

Te may access, preserve and shareyour information in response to
a legal request (like a search warrant, court order or subpoena) if we
have a good faith belief that the law requires us to do so. This may
include responding to legal requests from jurisdictions outside of the
United States where we have a good faith belief that the response is
required by law in that jurisdiction, affects users in that jurisdiction, and
is consistent with internationally recognized standards. We may also
access, preserve and share information when we have a good faith
belief it is necessary to: detect, prevent and address fraud and other
illegal activity; to protect ourselves, you and others, including as part of
investigations; and to prevent death or imminent bodily harm.... Wie
also may retain informationfrom accounts disabledJbr violations of our
terms for at least a year to prevent repeat abuse or other violations of
our terms.69
The bottom line is that once individuals post information on Facebook, neither
the courts nor Facebook itself can promise that the information will remain
private and confidential. So much for those improved privacy settings.
Google, a company that stores information through Gmail, Android, Picasa.,
Google+ (the Facebook competitor), and a myriad of other online applications,
is no better than Facebook at protecting or ensuring user privacy. When signing
tip for Google, you agree through a series of complicated hyperlinks that:
When you upload or otherwise submit content to our Services, you give
Google (and those we work with) a worldwide license to use, host,
store, reproduce, mod/i@, create derivative works ... communicate,
publish, publicly perfbrm, publicly display and distribute such
content ... This license continues even if you stop using our
Services .... 72
Google's privacy policy warns that, "Google processes personal information
on our servers in many countries around the world. We may process your
personal information on a server located outside the country where you live."
If there is, or should be, any legal framework for keeping our online data private,
then that framework must take into consideration how companies like Google
and Facebook store and use our information.

69. Data Use Policy, supra note 5 (emphasis added).
70. See id.
71. See About Google: Products, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/intl/en/about/products!
(last visited Feb. 13, 2013).
72. Google Terms of Service, GOOGLE, http:/vwww.google.com/int1/us/toolbar/ie/tos en.html
(last modified Mar. , 2012) (emphasis
r
added).
73.

Privacy Policy, supra note 6 (emphasis added).
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B. Businesses and Consumers Also Share the Contents of Their Computers
and Digital Devices by 4greeing to Use Cloud Storage
Not only are individuals and businesses placing information at risk and
potentially waiving their rights to privacy by sharing bits and pieces of data with
third-party sites like Facebook, some are going a step further. They are agreeing
to store all of their documents-everything that would traditionally be saved on
a personal hard drive, computer work station, or company server-on third-party
storage devices, or series of devices or servers, around the country and the

world.74
Microsoft, for instance, encourages individual consumers to go to the cloud
by boasting that it "helpls] customers take a key step toward better business
agiilty, econics, and user experieces.
Microsoft, however, tells its
customers only vaguely what the cloud is."6 To Microsoft, the cloud is one's
agreement to store personal documents on the "Windows SkyDrive,"n which is
not in the sky, but on Microsoft's own servers, or a series of servers around the
world on which Microsoft stores information with yet another third party. 8
Similarly, the new tablet and smart-phone manufacturers are not stopping to
explain how a tiny affordable device can possibly access and store a myriad of
files and documents while having little or no storage space of its own. Chris
Anderson, Editor in Chief of WJired Magazine, explains:
Finally, the cloud shows that as more and more of our data and
software lives in servers somewhere, the computers we carry with us
can be less and less powerful-thinner, lighter, longer battery life. Let
Google buy the big iron; you can buy the sexy aluminum and glass
that's a delight to hold]79

74. According to the National Institute of Standards and Technology, cloud computing is a
model for enabling convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable
computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly
provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction." Gilbert,
supra note 11, at 18 (quoting NIST Cloud Conputing Program, NIST, http://www.nist.gov/
itl/cloud/ (last updated Dec. 18, 2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
75. Cloud Computing, MICROSOFT ENTERPRISE, http://www.microsoft.com/enterprise/ittrends/cloud-computing/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2013).
76. See id.
77. See Free Your Files, MICROSOFT SKYDRIVE, http://windows.microsoft.com/en-US/sky
drive/download (last visited Feb. 13, 2013).
78. See Any File, Anywhere, MICROSOFT SKYDRIVE. http://windows.microsoft.comien-US/
skydrive/any-file-anywhlere#1ITC-1 (last visited Feb. 13, 2013) (describing how one can access
SkyDrive files from anywhere).
79. Chris Anderson, Ditch Your Laptop, WIRED, Apr. 2010, at 85, 85.
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Apple recently introduced iCloud, which offers to store every file on a user's
laptop. phone, and tablet at a third-party location Apple controls and owns.
Google and Verizon are also offering their own cloud-books and thin-clients,
which allow users to access all of their data and files through a high-speed
device, like a tablet or phone, while storing nothing of consequence on the
device itself.8
The plain truth, however, is that the cloud is someone else's computer. And
that someone else wants to hold, and probably, own its customers' files and data.
Citizens who value privacy should be nervous, for the companies that want to
store personal data on their "big iron" and simply allow users to visit the
documents they create, spreadsheets they build, and books they buy are the same
companies that force customers to agree to terms of service that will give these
giant corporations a right to read, use, and pilfer customer data for value.1 What
is worse, these are the same companies who will share personal data already in
their control with law enforcement if it is in their best interest to do so.
notwithstanding the law. Furthermore, there is little or no legal obligation for
these companies to keep the information stored on the cloud private.84
Apple's iCloud Terms of Service provide:
You understand that by using the Service, you consent and agree to
the collection and use of certain information about you .... You further
consent and agree that Apple may collect, use, transmit, process and
maintain information related to your Account, and any devices or
computers registered thereunder .... [T]his information may be
transferred to the United States and/or other countries for storage,
processing and use by Apple, its affiliates, and/or their service
prov iders.
Another hyperlink away, in the Privacy Policy, Apple tells its customers that it
will indeed share personal and nonpersonal information with third parties: "At
times Apple may make certain personal information available to strategic
partners that work with Apple to provide products and services, or that help

80. See generally iLloud, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/icloud/features! (last visited Feb. 14,
2013) (explaining iCloud's features).
81. See Wireless Watch, Google Revives 'Network Computer' with Dual-OS Assault on MS.
'THE REGISTER (Dec. 13, 2010), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/12/13/google revives network
computer again/.
82. See, e.g., iCloud Terms and Conditions, supra note 5 ("You acknowledge and agree that
Apple may, without liability to you, access, use, preserve, and/or disclose your Account information
and Content .. ").
83. See id.
84. See Christopher Soghoian, Note, Caught in the Cloud: Privacy, Encryption, and
Government Back Doors in the Web 2. 0 Era. 8 J. TELECOMMI. & HIGH TECH. L. 359, 378-79 (2010)
(citing Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693 (2009); 15 U.S.C. 1693g (2008)).
85. iLloud Terms and Conditions, supra note 5 (emphasis added).
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Apple market to customers."8 Later, the Privacy Policy provides, similar to
Facebook's Data Use Policy,8 that Apple will hand over information to law
enforcement whenever Apple decides it is in its best interest to do so:
It may be necessary-by law, legal process, litigation, and/or
requests from public and governmental authorities within or outside
your country of residence-for Apple to disclose your personal
information. We may also disclose information about you if we
determine that for purposes of national security, law enforcement, or
other issues of public importance, disclosure is necessary or
appropriate.
In other words, once a person saves data on Apple's computers, the data belongs
to Apple, and Apple will use and share it as it deems fit and profitable.
Businesses are moving towards cloud storage as well.89 Skeptics are rightly
concerned about confidentiality and privacy. 90 Many scholars and critics have
advised companies to approach cloud storage with caution.91 For instance, a
New York state ethics opinion counsels attorneys to store client data with a
third-party cloud vendor only after taking "reasonable care to ensure that the
system is secure and that client confidentiality [is] maintained," which includes
ensuring that the online data storage rovider has an "enforceable obligation to
preserve confidentiality and security."
Unfortunately, there is no general or all-encompassin legal duty requiring a
third-party cloud vendor to keep all of your data private. Certainly, a law firm
could, and should, enter into a well-drafted contract with the cloud service
provider; however, there is no uniform federal law, and only a few state laws,
allowing a contract to supersede a validly issued criminal subpoena., or perhaps
even a civil subpoena, sent directly to the third-party storage provider.94
By way of further example, some have suggested that medical providers that
store patient data with a third-party cloud vendor could be in violation of the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) privacy rules

86. PrivacyPolicy, supra note 26.
87. See Data Use Policy, supra note 5.
88. Privacy Policy, supra note 26 (emphasis added).
89. See Gilbert, supra note I1, at 1.
90. See, e.g., Cloud with a Chance of Rain, ECONOMIST (Mar. 5. 2010), http://wvv.
economist. com/node/ 15640793 (describing how information technology departments at corporations
are hesitant to embrace cloud storage).
91. See, e.g., Herbert B. Dixon Jr., Cloud Computing, JUDGES' J., Spring 2012, at 36, 38
("Murphy's Law applies even in the cloud.").
92. N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'I Ethics, Formal Op. 842 (2010).
93. See Soghoian, supra note 84 (citing Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693
(2009); 15 U.S.C. § 169 3 g (2008)).
94. See Gilbert, supra note 11. at 29 (implying that a cloud provider does not have a uniform
duty to keep information private because "different rules apply1 to different types and categories of
information).
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because most cloud-storage terms of service would conflict with HIPAA's
requirements for medical providers to obtain a "business associates" waiver in
order to disseminate information to any third party. Thus, a medical provider
could be liable for disclosing patient data simply by handing it over to the cloud
storage vendor.96 To solve this problem, a market has developed where cloud
services charge a premium to use "HIPAA-secure clouds."
C. Our Information Is Being Tracked and Stored, WJithout Our Knowledge
and Consent, by the TWTeb sites We Visit, Search Engines TWe Use, and
the Data-mining Companies fWho Profit from Scraping Our Data from
the Publicly Available Sources
In addition to the data that customers share with social networking sites,
Google, and cloud service providers, individuals also share data about their
Internet usage in other unlikely ways, sometimes simply by surfing the
Internet. 98 Even when we believe we are anonymously visiting web sites, datamining companies, curious corporations, and the web sites themselves use
tracking methods, cookies, and legal spyware to watch and store information
about what we do on the Internet.99
Web sites, or third-party companies cooperating with a web site, send a
small piece of code to your computer when you visit the web site. 100 This
software is called a "cookie." 1o1 Once a company places a cookie on your
computer it can track information about you, including whether you are a
returning user, the sites you visited before, and after visiting their web site, the
items you view on a web site, and sometimes even the information you enter into
the computer while on the web site:

95. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.504(e) (2003); see also Lisa J. Sotto et al., Privacy and Data
Security Risks in Cloud Computing, 15 ELECTRONIC COM. & L. REP. 186, 186 (2010) (explaining
cloud computing in the healthcare setting).
96. See Sotto et al., supra note 95, at 186.
97. See, e.g., How Synform Provides a HIPAA Compliant Cloud Backup Solution,
SYMFLORM, http://www.symform.com/our-solutions/compliance/hipaa-conpliance/ (last visited Feb.
15, 2013) (describing the services Symform provides to attain HIPAA compliance).
98. See Dave Roos, How to Surf the Web Anonymously, HOwSTUFFWORKS,
http://electroics.iowstuffw orks.com/how-to-tech/how-to-surf-the-web-anony mous.ihitm (last visited
Feb. 15, 2013).
99. See generally Anne Klinefelter, When to Research Is to Reveal: he Growing [hireat to
Attorney and Client Confidentialityfrom Online Tracking, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1,4, 5-18 (2011)
(citations omitted) (describing how despite people's beliefs that their actions on the internet are
confidential, a variety of tracking mechanisms exist); Christopher Maag, Don't Track Me: The Wlar
over Online Ads Starts Now, CREDIT.COM (Feb. 2, 2011), http://blog.credit.com/201 1/02/don'ttrack-ne-the-war-over-online-ads-starts-now (same).
100. See Cookies & Google Analytics on Webs ites, GOGLE DEVELOPERS, https://
developers.google.comn ialytics/resources/concepts/gaConceptsCookies (last visited Feb. 15, 2013).
101. See id.
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The amount and type of information gathered by these tools is almost as
varied as the number of cookies. Some might track just your IP address,
which allows them to see your actual physical address, often down to
the block. Others, especially super-cookies and sophisticated tools
called beacons, can record everything you type when you're online, how
far down the page you scroll, and what you're looking at when you click
102
away.
For instance, when eBay tracks you with a cookie, it can track and store all of the
items you view online, the searches you make, your address and credit card
information, and more.os These web sites claim to store the information to
better serve customers when they return.104 However, the web sites make no
promises to delete all the information they collect.
The intrusion is even greater when a third-party data-mining company
installs cookies on someone's computer and gathers information about them
through a seemingly innocuous web site which has no obvious affiliation with
the data-mining company. In May 2011, the European Union adopted a law that
requires a user's consent for a third party to use cookies. o0 Unfortunately, we
have no such law in the United States. In other words, your favorite news web
site, in exchange for a fee, could allow third parties to install cookies on your
computer when you visit. These third parties could then study how you use the
news site and generate a database of your likes and dislikes to use as they please.
If this seems far-fetched, it is not. For instance, Yahoo! plainly admits that it
allows third parties to install cookies on your computer in order to track your
behavior online:
Yahoo! may allow certain partners to include web beacons
[sophisticated cookies] within pages on the Yahoo! network of websites.
Yahoo! may also share portions of our log file data, including IP
address, with these partners for analytics purposes... . These partners
aggregate information about our advertising and what you see on
Yahoo! and then provide auditing, research and reporting for us and our
advertisers. Yahoo! allows web beacons from and shares log file data
with the following partners ... : AdXpose, AdSafe Media,

102. Maag, supra note 99.
103. See Aanaging Cookies, EBAY, http://pages.ebay.com/help/account/cookies.htnl (last visited
Feb. 15, 2013) ("[W]e use cookies to recognize you when you sign in, to remember your preferences,
and to allow you to navigate the site without having to keep reentering your password.").
104. See, e.g., Cookies, WIeb Beacons, and Your Privacy, EBAY, http://pages.ebay.com/help/
account/cookies-web-beacons.htln (last visited Feb. 15, 2013) (listing the ways in which the web
site uses cookies to provide features and services).
105. See New EU Cookie Law (e-Privacy Directive), INFO. CONISSIONER'S OFF., http://
www.ico.gov.uk/for organisations/privacy and electronic communications/theguide/cookies.aspx
(last visited Jan. 25, 2013). Consent, however, may be implied. See id.
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comScore/ScorecardResearch ... KN Dimestore, Double Verify, Yahoo!
Search Marketing Tools . . . .106
Cookies were used for so long before anyone understood how they worked
that they are now an integral part of contemporary e-commerce.'o
What is
frightening is "[n]obody, even the U.S. Government, knows exactly who is
tracking online customers and how they're doing it." 08
1
When the FTC proposed
a "do not track" otion for all web browsing, the Internet industry voiced its
strong opposition.
In response to the FTC's proposal that consumers be given
a right to opt out of Internet tracking, similar to their "Do Not Call" right to opt
out of telemarketing, an Internet advertising spokesperson stated: "If your goal is
to have a red flashing icon that says, 'Click here to opt out of targeting,' and to
incentivize people to opt out, then we don't share that goal."1"o The FTC tabled
the bill in response to the strong opposition, under the guise that it was "still
considering public comments on the report." II When Senator John McCain and
then-Senator John Kerry proposed an online privacy bill in spring 2011, which
also contained a do-not-track provision,' the leading Internet-based companies,
not surprisingly, opposed it.
Instead, they assured Congress and the public
that the industry could regulate itself.
This bill died in committee, and no
subsequent legislation has been introduced in the Senate.
Even if lawmakers could somehow limit or prohibit the use of cookies to
track an individual's online data, data miners and web sites might still be able to
track the same information by simply looking for an individual's online digital
fingerprint. 116 Based on a recent study, experts have learned that a handful of
very simple settings on the computers we use to access the Internet actually

106. Third Parties on Yahoo'. YAHOO! PRIVACY POLICY. http://info.yahoo.com/privacy/us!
yahoo/thirdparties/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2013).
107. See Maag, supra note 99, at 2 ("'The thing that didn't happen that should've happened is
that ... we didn't work with the consumer to help them understand wliat was getting tracked,' says
Steve Sullivan of the Interactive Advertising Bureau . . . .").
108. Maag, supra note 99, at 2 (quoting Eduard Goodman, Chief Privacy Officer, Identity
Theft 911 (Credit.com's sister company)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
109. See Edward Wyatt & Tanzina Vega, F.TC.Backs Plan to Honor Privacy of Online
Users, N.Y. TIMIES, Dec. 2, 2010, at Al.
110. Id. (quoting Mike Zaneis, Senior Vice President & Gen. Counsel, Interactive Adver.
Bureau) (internal quotation marks omitted).
111. The Do Not Track Option: Giving Consuners a Choice, FED. TRADE COMMISSION
RESOURCES FOR REPS., http://www.ftc.go-/opa/reporter/privacy/donottrack.shtnl (last modified
Dec. 5,2012).
112. See Commercial Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2011. S. 799, 112th Cong. § 202 (2011).
113. See Steven Gray, Washington Takes up Internet Privacy, TIMIEv
(Apr. 12, 2011), http://
www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2064849,00.htnl.
114. See id.
115. See S. 799 (112th): Commercial Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2011, GOVIRACK.US,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/ 112/s799 (last visited Feb. 16. 2013).
116. Peter Eckersley, How Unique is Your feb Browser?, in PRIVACY ENHANCING
TECHNOLOGIES 1, 3 (Mikhail J. Atallah & Nicholas J. Hopper eds., 2010).
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create a fingerprint that can identify us as unique users.
Using several
variables, such as screen resolution, type and version of web browser, system
fonts, time zone, plugins, and other settings on a computer, the watchers can run
an algorithm that identifies a computer's fingerprint when it is used to visit a
web site.118 This study is alarming because most users believe they are surfing
19
anonymous y.
Using this technology, every time someone visits a web site, the companies
monitoring the traffic could recognize the unique fingerprint and know that the
individual is returning to their site. Further, if the visitor at any time identified
himself while on the web site, that site could then match his unique fingerprint to
his actual identity and begin saving information about the person's viewing
history-without the use of a cookie.120 Thus, these digital fingerprints create
"implications both for privacy policy and technical design."12
Although the world of online tracking is complex and murky, it is clear that
we are sharing data about our online behavior and preferences with the sites we
visit and third parties who pay to get that information. It is equally clear that
there is no comprehensive legal framework for protecting the privacy of that
information after it has been gathered.
D.

Te Are Constantly SharingDataAbout Our WJhereabouts Through Our
Mobile Phones and PersonalGPS Devices

Although there are many other ways that individuals create and share data
about themselves than can be reasonably covered in this Article, one more
category of personal data merits attention: geolocation data, one's location on
Earth at any given moment.122 Through our phones, mobile devices, personal
GPS devices, and cars, we are constantly sharing information about where we
are and where we have been. 1 When a company or the government tracks your
location, they bring to mind "Big Brother" from George Orwell's 1984, capable
of watching your every move.124 Lawmakers must take this type of data into
consideration when creating a legal framework for privacy in the contemporary
digital world.

117. See id. at 2 ('83.6% of the browsers seen had an instantaneously unique fingerprint.").

118. See id. at 4, 5.
119. See Klinefelter, supra note 99, at 4.
120. See Eckersley, supra note 16, at 3.
121. Id. at 15.
122. Geolocation data reveals an individual's physical location and is "obtained using tracking
technologies such as GPS devices. IP geolocation using databases that map Internet IP addresses to
geographic locations, and financial transaction information."
Geolocation: Risk, Issues and
Strategies, ISACA, http://www.isaca.org/Knowledge-Center/Research!ResearchDeliverables/Pages!
Geolocation-Risks-Issues-and-Strategies.aspx (last visited Feb. 15, 2013).
123. See, e.g., Nick Bilton, Tracking File Found in iPhones, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2011, at BI
(describing how certain Apple products were storing users' location data).
124. See Orwell, supra note 4.
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Many of the devices we use and carry constantly track our location data.125
The software and service providers on our phones purportedly ask our
permission to use our geolocation information for advertising purposes.
However, our mobile service providers track our phone's location and store that
data even when we refuse permission.127 Both Google, who is responsible for
the Android mobile operating system, and Apple have recently been accused of
tracking phone users' locations even when the customers do not provide
12~8
permission for them to do So.
What is more, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) now
requires, or is in the process of requiring, commercial mobile-services companies
to be compliant with the enhanced 911 rules, which will req uire them, within one
year of January 18, 2011, to be able to locate individual customers within 100
meters of their location in 60% of the counties where that mobile service
provider does business.129
Given that the FCC's enhanced 911 rules mandate geolocation tracking, no
one can truly opt out of location tracking. We may be able to opt out of allowing
Verizon, AT&T, and others, from sharing our location information with thirdparty vendors and data-mining companies, but it seems that they will be required
to locate us at any given time and will likely track each of us constantly.130
Even if we were to decipher a reliable way to disable the geolocation
tracking capability on our phones, the GPS devices in our cars could still track us
most of the time.TI "Now you're in a situation where, if someone has the time
and expertise, they can say you drove from here to there at this speed, you
parked at Whole Foods . . . then you got back in your car and drove here . . . ."132
Indeed, OnStar recently revealed that it had been storing its customers' vehicle
location information, even after the customers had terminated their OnStar
service. 13 Although it has back tracked on its decision to track ex-customers,

125. See, e.g., Biton, supra note 123 (describing how iPhone were "logging users'
locations"); Chris Foresman, Google Faces $50 Million Lawsuit over Android Location Tracking,
WIRED (May 1. 2011, 10:27 AM), http://www.wired.com/business/2011/05/google-faceslawsuit/all! (describing how Android devices cache users' data).
126. See Foresman, supra note 125.
127. See Bilton, supra note 123 ("Law enforcement officials can already get this type of
location information from cellphone companies . . .
128. See id.; Foresman, supra note 125.
129. See 47 C.F.R. § 20.18(h)(1) (2011).
130. See Peter Maass & Megha Rajagopalan, That's No Phone. That's M1y Tracker, N.Y.
'TIMES, July 15, 2012 (Sunday Review), at 5.
131. See, e.g., Mike Brunker, Digital Evidence Becoming Central in Crtiminal Cases, OPEN
CHANNEL (Nov. 11, 2011, 5:58 AM), http://openciannel.nbcnews.com news/2011/11/11/8743687digital-evidence-becoming-central-in-criminal-cases?lite (discussing how today's automobiles have
computers storing information).
132. Id. (quoting Dean Gonsowski, e-discovery counsel, Clearwell) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
133. Chris Davies. Onstar Backtracks on GPS Tracking, SLASHGEAR (Sept. 28, 2011),
http://www.slashgear.com/onstar-backtracks-on-gps-tracking-28183515/ (citing Ontar Reverses
Decision to Change Terns and Conditions, GM NEWS (Sept. 27, 2011), http://media.gm.com/content
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OnStar's statements implicitly admit that the company certainly tracks and stores
location information for current customers.134 Now, OnStar customers can pay
extra money to access tracking information with which customers can track all of
their family cars from a home computer.
And, as seems to be the case with all data that can be stored, OnStar's data
likely will be stored and kept. In 2004, Dr. Robert P. Minch from Boise State
University predicted: "Disclosure [of location data] will almost certainly occur in
the marketplace unless prohibited or discouraged. Just as database marketing
firms have offered for sale the phone numbers of virtually every resident in
countries such as the U.S., it seems inevitable that location information will
similarly be marketed."'1 6 Sure enough, by 2010, "[b]oth Google and Apple
[were] gathering information 'as part of their race to build massive databases
capable of pinpointing people's locations,' . . . which could help them tap into a

multi-billion [dollar] market for location-based services."'1

7

Google utilizes

Google Maps for Mobile so customers may "find [theiselves] on a map and

thecn locate places nearby "

Goog"Ic expa ins

Estimating your location can be done in several different ways.
Because GPS is not always available and locations derived from cell
towers aren't very accurate, Google (and other Internet companies) use
publicly broadcast Wi-Ti data from wireless access points to improve
our location-based services. By using signals from these access points,
your mobile device is able to fix its general location quickly without
using too much power.
Unless and until information about our location is meaningfully protected from
disclosure once stored, it seems likely that our mobile service providers will use
the information for their benefit.
The issue of whether individuals have a right to privacy with regard to
location is receiving considerable attention in criminal cases as well. The United

media/us/en/gm news.detail.htnl/content/Pages/news/us/en/2011 /Sep /0927 onstar.html)
("OnStar
has bowed to public and governmental pressure, and reversed its controversial decision to track exsubscribers using its in-car GPS navigation and support system.").
134. See OnStar Reverses Decision to Change Terms and Conditions, supra note 133.
135. See Keith Wagstaff, New OnStar Service Lets You Track Your Family's Cars Online,
TIME (Mar. 30, 2012). http://techland.tine.coin/2012/03/30/new-onstar-service-lets-you-track-yourfamilys-cars-online/.
136. Robert P. Minch. Privacv Issues in Location-Aware Mobile Devices, in 5 PROCEEDINGS
FROM THE 3 7TH HAWAlI INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SYSTEM SCINCES 1, 7 (2004).
137. Jonathan Oosting, Oakland Counit Women File $50M Lawsuit Against Google for
Android Tracking, MLIVE (Apr. 28, 2011, 1:51 PM), http://www.mlive.com/news/detroit/index.ssf
2011/04/oakland county women file 50m.html (quoting Julia Angwin & Jennifer ValentinoDevries, Apple, Google Collect User Data. WALL ST. J., Apr. 22, 2011. at Bl).
138. Location-Based Services. GOOGLE MAPS. http://support.google.con/maps/bin/answer.
py hl=en&answer-1725632 (last visited Feb. 16, 2013).
139. Id.
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States Supreme Court granted certiorari in a case, in which the Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit held that law enforcement did indeed need a warrant before
placing a GPS tracking device on a suspect's vehicle. 140 The Seventh, Eighth
and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals faced the same issue and concluded the
opposite-that law enforcement does not require a warrant, in part because
individuals in contemporary society do not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in their location.
The circuit split hinged on whether individuals have
a reasonable expectation of privacy in their location on earth. given the ubiquity
of mobile phone and consumer GPS tracking.142 The issue was presented to the
Supreme Court in United States v. Jones,143 in which the Court addressed
whether the Fourth Amendment permitted warrantless tracking of individuals'
cars with GPS devices. 144
Unfortunately, in deciding Jones, the Court avoided the issue of whether an
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his location.145 It held that
the defendant's rights were violated, not because he had an expectation of
privacy in his geolocation, but because law enforcement "physically occupied
private property for the purpose of obtaining information" when it placed a
tracking device on the defendant's vehicle. 14
The Court, therefore, never
reached the issue of "expectation of privacy," instead deciding the case solely on
the, arguably arcane, right to be free from government trespass.147 In her
concurrence. Justice Sotomayor correctly observed: "In cases of electronic or
other novel modes of surveillance that do not depend upon a physical invasion
on property, the majority opinion's trespassory test may provide little
guidance."
In other words, the question of whether a citizen has a right to
privacy from government tracking of "factory- or owner-installed vehicle
tracking devices or GPS-enabled smartphones" 49 remains unanswered. To
"remedy" the circuit split, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Seventh
and Ninth Circuit cases, simply remanding them to determine whether they are
"consistent" with Jones. 5o

140. See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 567 (D.C. Cir. 2010), reh'g denied sub
nom., 625 F.3d 766 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert granted, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011), aff'd 132 S. Ct. 945
(2012).
141. See United States v. Cuevas-Perez. 640 F.3d 272. 275-76 (7th Cir. 2011) vacated, 132 S.
Ct. 1534 (2012); United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 610 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1217 (9th Cir. 2010), vacated 132 S. Ct. 1533 (2012).
142. See Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d at 272, 275: Maynard, 615 F.3d at 555; Marquez, 605 F.3d
at 609; Pineda-Morena591 F.3d at 1214.
143. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
144. See id at 948.
145. See id. at 950.
146. Id. at 949.
147. See id. at 949, 950 (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (200 1)).
148. Id at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
149. Id
150. See Cuevas-Perez v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1534, 1534 (2012); Pineda-Moreno v.
United States, 132 S. Ct. 1533, 1533 (2012).
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Perhaps the Supreme Court surmised that a decision on whether there is a
reasonable expectation of privacy in an individual's location on Earth, would on
one hand, substantially bolster, or on the other, gravely debilitate, individual
privacy rights. Rather than make such a momentous decision, the Court opted to
decide the case on the "constitutional minimum" required. 51 A commentator
present at the oral argument in the Jones case observed that some of the Justices
were concerned about the Orwellian nature of geolocation tracking.
It is
encouraging that our Supreme Court does not wish to unwittingly create a Big
Brother. However, it is disappointing that the Court was unwilling to face the
issue head on. It seems that, for now, our privacy must be preserved through
legislation or rulemaking.
III. PRIVACY MATTERS:

IF WE CEDE

OUR RIGHT TO PRIVACY TO THE

MARKETING COMPANIES AND DATA MINERS, WE MAY UNW'ITTINGLY LOSE

OUR RIGHT TO PROTECT OURSELVES FROM UNWARRANTED GOVERNMENT
INTRUSION

Our right to privacy is in danger. It may already be lost. As discussed
above, we are knowingly and unknowingly bleeding data.
The companies
who claim to serve us and the government we empower to protect us use that
data in unimaginable ways. 4 Many individuals do not even realize how much
of their information is being stored and sold for profit by, and to, third parties. 155
Now that these third parties hold our data, we cannot control or predict how they
might use it in the future or with whom they might share it.
Some respond by arguing that just because someone could read and compile
our data, does not mean that they will-so-called security through obscurity.
They claim that the only entities reading our emails and tracking our behavior
are computers and software algorithms designed to help companies serve us
more effectively.
Thus, they argue, we should simply acquiesce to the
contemporary norm of personal data gathering and storage.158 Journalist Joel
Stein, in a Time article, wrote: "[T]he more I learned about data-mining, the less

151. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
152. See Orin Kerr, Reflections on the Oral Argument in United States v. Jones, the GPS
Fourth Amendment Case, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 8, 2011, 11:55 AM), http://www.
volokh.conV2011/11/08/Reflections-on-the-Oral-Argument-in-United-States-v-Jones-the-GPS-FourthAmendment-Case/ ("Justice Sotomayor and Ginsburg were both very worried about the Big Brother
implication of using GPS devices: I counted 5 or so references to Orwell's 1984.").
153. See supra notes 29-73 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 100-21 and accompanying text.
155. See Klinefelter, supra note 99, at 4.
156. See, e.g., Joel Stein, Your Data, Yourself TIME, March 21, 2011, at 40, 46 (believing that
no human ever reads your files).
157. See id. at 42 (arguing that advertisers are "only interested in tiny chunks of information"
about behavior, not an individual's name or location).
158. See id. at 46.
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concerned I was. Sure, I was surprised that all these companies are actually
keeping permanent files on me. But I don't think they will do anything with
them that does me any harm."1 9 He argues that the conveniences of modern
technology outweigh the loss of privacy, "[e]specially because no human being
ever reads your files." 160
But what Joel Stein and others forget is that plenty of flesh-and-blood beings
could read your files if they chose to do so. And even those who do not read
your data will likely make decisions about you based upon your personal
information that others have already tracked and stored. 161 What Joel Stein also
forgets is that when we lose control over our information and documents, when
we lose the right to keep certain information about us truly private, we open the
door to possible governmental abuse. There is a "general risk that the collection
of information on individuals will upset the balance between government and
individuals, resulting in a shift of power that is oppressive .
'..Accumulations
of information about individuals tend to enhance authority by making it easier
for authority to reach individuals directly."' 62
Imagine a governmental official or law enforcement officer who is
motivated to quiet a politically unpopular citizen.163 Now, imagine that the
government official, with a keystroke, could discover: each and every email
written and received from the citizen, the citizen's whereabouts for every minute
of every day for the past year, the e-books and magazines the citizen has
purchased, the web sites the citizen has visited, her friends' identities, and more.
Imagine the many ways that the government could reach the citizen and interfere
with her rights to pursue life, liberty, and freedom.
Sure, some of this information may have been discoverable decades ago
with the appropriate warrants and after a lot of work. But today, third parties are
tracking and storing an unimaginable amount of data and compiling it in j List a

159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See id. at 40 (discussing all the facts-correct and incorrect that data-mining companies
had "learned" about the author).
162. Chris Jay 1oofiagle, Big Brother's Little Helpers: How ChoicePoint and Other
Commercial DataBrokers Collect and Package Your Datafor Law Enforcement, 29 N.C. J. INT'L
L. & CoM. REG. 595, 596-97 (2004) (quoting PRIVACY PROT. STUDY COMM'N, PERSONAL
PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY 5 (1977)).

163. Should you doubt such a scenario, do not forget Joseph McCarthy and the "Red Scare."
the vilification of Julian Assange and WikiLeaks, or even the broad powers given to the Department
of Homeland Security and other federal law enforcement agencies in the wake of September II,
2001. See generally Seth F. Kreimer. Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between
Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 15-16 (1991) (discussing the
"Red Scare," Senator Joseph McCarthy's anti-communi st crusade of the 1950s);Peter G. Madrifian,
Note, Devil in the Details: ConstitutionalProblems Inherent in the hIternet Surveillance Provisions
of the USA Patriot Act of2001, Note, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 783, 785-86 (2003) (describing the broad
powers given under the Patriot Act); Shane & Bums, supra note 66; WiikiLeaks' Julian Assange
Says US Uses Facebook, G o ogle, to Spy, supra note 67 (illustrating attempts to "quiet" Julian
Assange).
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few locations from where it can be easily retrievedl64 and used to influence us,
quiet us, or threaten our constitutional rights. Our anonymity actually creates
due process; without anonymity we are vulnerable to unwanted government
intrusion.
As the Supreme Court held decades ago, without privacy, we lose the right
to protect ourselves from government intrusion, to defend ourselves from
criminal prosecution, and to demand due process.165 Although the Court in
Griswold was only concerned with the right of citizens to protect themselves
from unwarranted government intrusion, 66 private "database companies are
extremely solicitous to the government and actually design the databases for law
enforcement use." 167 For instance, "eBay ... revealed that it had crafted its
privacy policy to maximize efficiency in responding to law enforcement requests
for personal data." 68
Thus, the distinction between governmental privacy intrusions and those
committed by private third-party corporations, such as Google and Facebook,
becomes meaningless. This is especially so when law enforcement has almost
unlimited access to the information stored by these private third parties.169 And
it seems they do. In 2001, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) analyzed
whether it could use information gathered by ChoicePoint, one of the most
infamous data-mining companies at the time, without obtaining a warrant or
court order.
The FBI concluded that doing so was "minimally intrusive"
and that law enforcement "may use ChoicePoint to [its] heart's content."1
The distinction between government-held and privately-held data becomes
even more blurred, given the proposed association between the National Security
Administration (NSA) and Google.17 The NSA is the information gathering

164. See Michelle Kessler & Byron Acohido, Data 1iners Dig a Little Deeper, USA TODAY
(July 11, 2006, 10:11 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.coin/techinews/internetprivacy/2006-07-11data-mining_x.htm.
165. See Griswold v. Connecticut. 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (citing Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
166. See id. at 484-85 (citing Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630; Mapp v. Ohio, 376 U.S. 643, 656
(1961)).
167. Hoofnagle, supra note 162, at 599.
168. Id at 621 (citing Yuval Dror, Big Brother Is I'atching You - and Documenting,
IAARETZ (Feb. 20, 2003, 12:00 AM), http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/features/big-brother-iswatching-you-and-docunenting- 1.18491).
169. See FACEBOOK LAW ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 56.
170. See Memorandum from the Office of the Gen. Counsel, Nat'l Sec. Law Unit, Guidance
Regarding the Use of ChoicePoint for Foreign Intelligence Collection or Foreign Counterterrorism
Investigations, (Sept. 17. 2001), available at http://epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/cptbia.pdf.
171. Id
172. See Routing Slip, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Office of the Gen. Counsel, Nat'l Sec.
Law Unit (Sept. 16, 2001), available at http://epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/cptbic.pdf.
173. See Ellen Nakashima, Google to Enlist NSA to Wi'ard off Attacks. WASH. POST, Feb. 4,
2010, at Al, All; J.R. Raphael, The Google-NSA Alliance: Questions and Answers, PCWORLD
(Feb. 4, 2010, 3:04 PM), http:/ww'w.pcworld.com/article/188581/TheGoogleNSAAlliiance
Questions and Answers.html.
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arm of the federal intelligence agencies.174 It is, however, a governmental entity
bound to respect the privacy that citizens are afforded tinder the United States
Constitution and the Privacy Act of 1974, 17 which prohibits governmental
agencies from amassing information about individuals without a proper purpose
176
177
for doing so.
Google is not so limited.
Therefore, if Google and the NSA
were to cooperate in any regard, our privacy from governmental intrusion would
surely be in danger. In May 2012, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals seemed to
immunize Google and the NSA from Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)1
requests regarding their association. 9
Beyond the threats posed to our constitutional rights, privacy is important
for other fundamental reasons. Privacy is a component of freedom. When we
lose our privacy, we lose our freedom to re-invent ourselves each day. We lose
the freedom to choose, on our own, the companies with which we do business.
We lose the freedom to control who in our life knows what about us. We lose
the freedom to test new ideas, new philosophies and new selves, and then to
forget them when they do not work for us. We lose our right to be complex
humans defying categorization. Instead, we assume a unified online identityan amalgamation of our spending habits, location data, Internet-surfing behavior,
and wall postings-an identity ultimately beyond our control, but which has the
power to determine how we are embraced by society.
Since there is a right to privacy, 180 it is necessary to insist on a right to
protect oneself from the discovery of private information. Essentially, all of the
information stored in the cloud and on third-party servers and GPS locationservice devices, as well as our Internet activity, could be discoverable because
consumers have not insisted on a right to privacy. The consumer unknowingly
signed away his right to privacy because the stipulation was hidden in the
voluminous "terms and conditions." Furthermore, the consumer lacks the
bargaining leverage to insist on privacy with a multibillion-dollar corporation.
By ceding our rights to privacy, we also may be compelled to produce even
more information in civil and criminal trials. The subtle encroachment on an
individual's right to privacy will be all the more noticeable when that individual
is required to participate in discovery as part of a lawsuit or investigation. If

174. See About NSA, NATL SEC. AGENCY/CENT.

SEC. SERV., http:/www.nsa.goviabout/

index.shtml (last modified Nov. 29, 2011).
175. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006).
176. See id. 522a(e).
177. Google is not ain "agency" under the Act, and is therefore not limited by 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a(b), which provides that "[n]o agency shall disclose any record." See Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr.
v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 795 F. Supp. 2d 85, 91 (D.D.C. 2011) ("The text ofFOIA makes clear that the
statute applies to 'agenc[ies'F only.").
178. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006) (providing citizens with limited access to information controlled
by the United States government).
179. See Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Nat'1 Sec. Agency, 678 F.3d 926, 931-33 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
180. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (citing Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
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there is no recognizable right of privacy, then there can be no reasonable basis
for a confidentiality order or protective order. As the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the law of search and seizure currently stand, litigants or criminal
defendants, as part of the discovery process, could be compelled to produce
information into the public domain that they truly believed was private.18
IV. LAWMAKERS

MUST INTERVENE TO PROTECT U.S. CITIZENS
COMPLETELY LOSING THEIR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY

A.

FROM

The CurrentLaws Do Not Create a Comprehensive Right to Privacyjbr
US. Citizens

The average U.S. citizen would likely be surprised to learn that they do not
have an overarching right to privacy. The federal privacy statutes, although
numerous, provide far less protection than one would expect. According to an
article on ChoicePoint and other commercial data brokers, "American privacy
law tends to be sectoral and context based. Unlike other nations, the United
States lacks a comprehensive privacy law to protect data."' 82 Therefore,
lawmakers and judges must intervene on behalf of consumers to insist on a
fundamental right to privacy.
The Table below summarizes the various federal privacy statutes and
demonstrates that the federal statutory scheme provides limited protection for
personal data shared online. Most of the statutes govern state actors or law
enforcement alone8 and. even then, are riddled with exceptions. 184 Those
statutes that do seem to create a right to keep personal data private from third
parties are also ineffective, because the protections can often be superseded
when an individual consents to tracking, storage, and disclosure of personal
data. 185 The consumer consent exception creates a giant loophole that can be
exploited by corporations who include such consent provisions in their onesided, indecipherable online terms and conditions.186

181. See FED. R. Cly.P. 26(a)-(b).
182. Hoofnagle, supra note 162, at 618.
183. See, e.g., Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 10011010 (2006) (providing a frarnework for law enforcement agencies seeking information from
telecommunications carriers).
184. See, e.g., Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779
(1984) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 55 1(b) (2006)) (allowing a cable operator to use the cable system to
collect personally identifiable information with subscriber consent); Electronic Communications
Privacy Act, Stored Communications Act. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b) (2006) (providing exceptions for
disclosure of communications).
185. See, e.g., Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998. 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(l)-(2)
(2006) (requiring web sites to "obtain verifiable parental consent for the collection, use, or
disclosure of personal information from children"); Family Educational Rights & Privacy Act, 20
U.S.C. § 1232g(b), (d) (2006) (prohibiting the disclosure of personal information "of students
without written consent of the parents").
186. See Gilbert, supra note II, at 26-28.
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TABLE. SUXMARY OF FEDERAL PRIVACY STATUTES
Does it
What ty
Whose
Wh
hPC
of
Doveri
information
does it
information does
Facebook

Which entities
doe
i gven!
regulate?

protect?

Cable
Communications
Policy Act 87

Cable television
operators only

Cable
television
subscribers

Census
Confidentiality
1 88
Statute

Federal
Government
and Census
Bureau

Any
personally
identifiable
information
submitted to
census bureau
PII relating to
children 13
and younger

Children's
Online Privacy
Protection Act of
1998 189

Web sites
directed at
children 13 and
younger

Communications
Assistance For
Law
Enforcement
Actl91

Law
enforcement
and telecomnmunications carriers

Citizens who
are the subject
of an
investigation

Criminal Justice
Information
Systemsl92

Federal
Government

Arrestees

Exceptions?

it protect?
Requires cable
company to
disclose types of
personal data
collected;
prohibits data
collection absent
consent
Census data only

& Google?
No

No

Information can be used for
the statistical purposes for
which census is conducted

Personally
identifiable
information
relating to children
13 and younger

Yes (but
Facebook
has found a
way around
the
statute 190
No

Web sites can collect PII
with "verifiable parental
consent"

No

Can be used for statutorily
authorized purposes, but
must otherwise be kept
confidential

Not really a
protectionsimply requires
law enforcement
to seek a warrant
before monitoring
electronic
communications
(mobile phone

Cable company can collect
data and share it with third
parties with"prior written or
electronic consent" or other
reasons listed by the statute

Law enforcement may
monitor communications
and location in "emergency
or exigent circumstances"

wiretaps)

Information
relating to their
arrest and the
subsequent
disposition

187. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (1984)
(codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-553 (2006)).
188. 13 U.S.C. § 9 (2006).
189. 15 U.S.C. §6501-6506 (2006).
190. See Emily Bazelon, The Young and the Friended, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 16, 2011,
available at http://www.ni ytines.com/2011/10/16/magazine/wvy-facebook-is-after-your-kids.html.
191. 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (2006).
192. Justice System Improvement Act of 1979, § 818, Pub. L. No. 96-157, 93 Stat. 1167
(1979) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 3789g (2006)).
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Which entities
does it govern/
regulate?

infose
WhoseDosi
mnformation
does it
protect?

Consumers

What type of
.
eo
information does

Does it
govern
Facebook

it protect?

& Google?

Fairly broad.

Does not apply when

Customer

Telecommuni-

Proprietary

cations carriers

Protects

custonerprovides approval,

Network
Informationl9

(including
mobile phone
service
providers)

which all carriers require in
their consumer contracts:
additional exceptions for
911 compliance, to assist in
an emergency situation, and
to protect the rights of users

Driver's Privacy
Protection
Act194

State
Departments of
Motor Vehicles

Individuals
whose
information is
held by DMV
(license and
title holders)

Drug &
Alcoholism
Abuse
Confidentiality
Statutes

Entities
conducting
federallyfunded research
or treatment of
alcohol and
drug abuse

Patients and
Test Subjects

information that
relates to the
quantity,
destination,
location, and
amount of use of a
telecommunications
service
Prohibits
disclosure of
personal
infonimation and
highly restricted
personal
information unless
for "permissible
use"
"Records of the
identity, diagnosis,
prognosis, or
treatment of any
patient"

Electronic
Communications Privacy
Act of 1986,
Stored
Communications Actl96

Entities
providing
"electronic
communication
service[s]" or
"remote
computing
service" such as
web mail
providers and
social
networking
sites

Consumers

Electronic
communications
in "storage" (not
in transit or stored
ephemerally);
excludes data that
is not a
'communication"

No

Exceptions?

No

So many "permissible uses,"
this statute is meaningless;
can be used by any
governmental agency, any
law enforcement agency, to
confirm ownership and with
consent from the individual

No

May not be used to "initiate
or substantiate" criminal
charges absent a court order,
otherwise, only exceptions
are with consent or to assist
with a bona fide medical
emergency

Yes

There is a major exception
that allows use and
disclosure of
"communications" with
consent from the sender or
receiver; the statute also
allows disclosure to law
enforcement

193. Telecommunications Act of 1996, § 702. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996)
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 222 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)).
194. Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725 (2006).
195. 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2 (2006).
196. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 27012712 (2006)).
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Which entities
iit gven!
does doe
govern/
regulate?

Whose
information
nosat
protect?
Employees
and
prospective
employees

What ty
Wha tpe does
of
information

Does it
Dovesrn
Facebook

it protect?
Employee
polygraph test
results

& Google?
No (unless
these
companies
required an
employee
to take a
polygraph
test)
No (unless
these
companies
unlawfully
pull credit
reports
without a
alid
statutor
puipose)

Employee
Polygraph
Protection Act of
1988

Employers

Fair Credit
Reporting
Act; 98
Consumer Credit
Reporting
Reform Act of
9

Credit reporting
companies,
creditors, and
individuals/
entities who
request credit
reports

Individuals/
Consumers

Detailed contents
of credit reports

Familr
Educational
Rights & Privacy
Act 200

Educational
institutions

Students and
their paiewts

No
Educational
records and
personally
idenitifiable
vother
information
than directory'
inottuationto

Consumers

Personally
Identifiable
Information and
nonpublic
financial
information
(account numbers
SS# and more)

Financial
Gramm Leach
0institutions,
Bile Act
including
retailers who
extend credit

No

745

Exceptions?
Court must court order
disclosure, and disclosure
must be for the purposes of
investigating or prosecuting
a crime

Limits the information that
credit repomng agencies can
disclose and iequires
disclosure 001) for
pensussible purposes
requires notification to
consumners when theii credit
infonsation has been
consumers
i
requested allows
to contest accuracs o data
collected about them
Disclosure allowed.
generallswith consent from
parents, to transferee school
with notice to parents, to
goainemaent or law
enforcement, or to assist
with requests for financial
aid
Disclosure allowed: with
consent from customer, to
assist law enforcement, to
present fraud and to compl
with a valid ciil or criminal
subpoena

N

197. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).
198. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x (2006).
199. Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009426 (1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2006)).
200. 20 U.S.C. § 123 2g (2006 & Supp. V 2012).
201. See id. § 1232g(b)(1).
202. Gramm Leach Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 6801-6827 (2006 & Supp. V 2012)).
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Which entities
does it govern/
regulate?

infose
WhoseDosi
information
does it
protect?
Patients

What type of
.
eo
information does

Does it
govern
Facebook

it protect?
Information about
medical care and
"individually
identifiable health
information"

& Google?
No (but
discussion
of patient
information
over gmail
or webbased email
could be a
violation of
the privacy
rule)
No

Health Insurance
Portability &
Accountability
Act (HIPAA) of
199603

Health plans,
medical
providers and
their covered
business
associates

Privacy Act of

Federal
government

Individuals

All records about
individuals held
by a government
agency

Government
Officers and
Employees

Journalists

Information
relating to news
stories, books and
pieces of
journalism

1974; 4
Paperwork
Reduction

Privacy
Protection Act of
1980206

[VOL. 64: 717

No

Exceptions?
Disclosure allowed: with
patient consent and to
cooperate with law
enforcement (in some
occasions even without
subpoena, warrant or court
order)

Agencies and federal
government cannot disclose
records to any person
without the individual's
consent unless for one of
several permissible
purposes, including pursuant
to a valid court order or to
assist law enforcement (even
without court order)
Law enforcement may not
seize journalistic records
without a valid warrant or
court order, unless the
journalist is the subject of
the investigation or it is
necessary to protect

Right to
Financial Privacy
Act of 1978207

Financial
Institutions and
Government

Banking
customers

Financial records

No

203. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996); see also 45 C.F.R. §
(2011) (regulating the privacy of individually identifiable health information).
204. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006).
20 5 . 45 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3521 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).
206. 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (2006).
207. 12 U.S.C. §§3401-3422 (2006 & Supp. V 2012).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol64/iss3/8

someone from bodily harm
or death
Banks may not disclose
financial information about
customers to the government
without a signed and
approved revocable
customer consent fomn or
pursuant to a valid search
warrant or subpoena

164.501-164.534
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Statute
Wiretap
Statutes;
Communications

BLEEDING DATA IN A POOL OF SIHARKS
Which entities
iit gven!
does doe
govern/
regulate?
All persons,
including law
enforcement

Act of 1934 209

Whose
information
nomat
protect?
Individuals

What ty
of
Wha tpe does
information
it protect?
Wire, oral, or
electronic
communication

Does it
Dovern
Facebook
No

747

Exceptions?
It is unlawful fr any
individual to intercept a
communication to which
they are not a party; law
enforcement may do so, but
only with a valid warrant or
court order

One of the most striking features of this summary of federal privacy statutes
is that there are only two statutes that prohibit companies like Facebook and
Google from invading an individual's privacy by storing and tracking their data.
With regard to the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998,20
Facebook has found a way around that statute by not allowing individuals under
the age of thirteen to join Facebook at all-a policy that the company must
surely know is impossible to enforce. 211 The second statute that prohibits
companies like Facebook from invading individual privacy, the Stored
Communications Act (SCA) that is part of the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act (ECPA), 2 is simply ineffective, as discussed further below.
State statutory and common law provide some privacy protection in the
absence of adequate federal statutory safeguards.
For instance, many
jurisdictions offer protection through social security number protection statutes,
detailed and powerful identity theft laws,214 and tort recovery from invasion of
privacy, appropriation, intrusion, and public disclosure of private facts.215
California even "includes an express privacy right in its Constitution."216

208. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 2522 (2006 & Supp. V 2012).
209. 47 U.S.C. 605 (2006).
210. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506 (2006).
211. Facebook: Help Center, How Do I Report a Child Under the Age of 13?, https://www.
facebook.com/help/441374602560317/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2013) ("Facebook requires individuals
to be at least 13 years old before they can create ain account.").
212. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508. 100 Stat. 1848
(1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2701-2712 (2006)).
213. See infra Part V.B.
214. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-9-121 (2011) (setting forth the elements of identity fraud);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-19-85 (Supp. 2012) (criminalizing fraudulent use of another's identity or
social security number); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-13-510(A) (Supp. 2011) ("It is unlawful for a person
to commit the offense of financial identity fraud or identity fraud.").
215. See Elizabeth D. DeArmond, A Dearth of Remedies, 113 PENN ST. L. REv. 1, 39-42
(2008) ("Thus, the common law of torts offers a number of avenues to pursue those who breach
privacy.").

216. Rende T. Lawson, Cloud Computing and IT Outsourcing Unfbreseen Hiccups for
eDiscovery in the Vake of Quon v. Arch Wireless?, in ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY GUIDANCE 2010:
WHAT CORPORATE AND OUTSIDE COUNSEL NEED TO KNow 213 (Practising Law Institute 2010).
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However, given the broad reach of the Internet and the current strong political
will to regulate privacy from Washington, D.C., it seems that a majority of the
state-level privacy protections will soon be preempted by a federal legislative
response 217 and may, despite their efforts, be too localized to provide adequate
protection.
Indeed, "the common law of torts offers a number of avenues to pursue
those who breach privacy. However, the torts, interpreted in a cramped and
faded way, may insufficiently protect individuals from modern privacy
invasions."
In one example, the Illinois Appellate Court recently
distinguished "personal" from "private" information-holding that a plaintiff in
Illinois cannot sue for damages inder a theory of common law invasion of
privacy when the alleged damages are caused only by a third party's disclosure
of "personal" information, rather than the disclosure of "private" information.219
The court defined "private" facts as those that are "facially embarrassing and
highly offensive if disclosed."220 Using that definition of "private facts," the
court held that there is no private cause of action for damages caused by
disclosure of "names and social security numbers."22 By analogy, outside of a
particular statutory right of privacy, citizens, at least in Illinois, could not claim a
common law right of privacy to most personal information they intentionally,
and unintentionally, share online and through their phone with Google,
222
Facebook, Apple, and others.
Because of the spotty coverage and overall inadequacy of American privacy
law and combined with the frightening power of Google, Facebook, and other
private corporations that are compiling massive databases of information about
people for profit and sharing those databases with governmental agencies,
Congress should act now to create a comprehensive, coherent privacy statute.
B. The Stored Communications 4ct Should Be Amended or Replaced
Because It Is Inejfective
Of the federal privacy statutes in force, the ECPA, which includes the
SCA,
seems to provide the most likely basis for meaningful protection from
third parties that store and process personal data. That statute was intended to

217. For example, the Kerry-McCain Commercial Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2011, if
passed, will mostly preempt state privacy law. Daren M. Orzechowski et al., US Privacy Law;
Developmnents-bpdate (April 27, 2011), wvy.whitecase.com/articles-0427201 I/ (citing
Commercial Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2011, S.799, 112th Cong. §§ 601(b), (d) (2011)).
218. DeArmond, supra note 215, at 42.
219. Cooney v. Chicago Pub. Sch., 943 N.E.2d 23, 32 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).
220. Id.
221. Id
222. See id
223. Orin S. Kerr, A Users Guide to the Stored Commununications Act, and a Legislator's
Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1208, 1208 (2004).
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protect the privacy of electronic "communications" stored with third parties.224
Although the SCA does not apply to criminal warrants and subpoenas, it does
protect communications from civil subpoenas and other disclosure requests.
The statute would thus seem to prevent companies like Google from disclosing
individual emails and text messages pursuant to a civil subpoena or a request
from anyone other than the originator or recipient of the message.226 It has even
been held to protect postings on a Facebook "wall" from disclosure to third
parties, although it does not apply to other portions of Facebook that are not
"communications."
There are, however, some real problems with the SCA. First, it protects too
narrow a category of data. When it was written, the Internet was in its infancy,
and no one could imagine the broad range of documents and information that
people would voluntarily store on other people's servers, much less the cloud.
As a result, the SCA protects only "communications," which includes emails,229
instant messages, and perhaps, as the Crispin court held, wall postings on
Facebook.230 The SCA does not cover photos, profiles, or the entire contents of
your personal hard drive, much less the laundry list of items that Facebook tracks
and stores. The statute should, therefore, be amended or replaced with a statute
that prevents a third party who is storing any of your data, not just your
communications, from disclosing it to third parties.
There is another problem with the statute. The SCA expressly allows-and
may arguably require-a third-party "remote computing service" (read "web
site") or "electronic communication service," (read "web-mail provider") to
release your own data to you when you request it.231 Therefore, the statute
cannot prevent a court in a civil case from ordering a party to demand the release
of their own data, then ordering that party to hand it over to their litigation
opponent. A Pennsylvania court did just that in Largent v. Reed when it ordered

224. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a).
225. See 18 U.S.C. §2703(c).
226. See id.
227. See Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 989, 991 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
228. "The terms [in the SCA] are somewhat confusing because they reflect the state of
computing technology as it existed in 1986 (a time before smartphones, Facebook, and the World
Wide Web)." Largent v. Reed, No. 2009-1823, 2011 WL 5632688, slip op. at 10 (Pa. Ct. Corn. Pl.
Nov. 8, 2011) (citing Kerr, supra note 223, at 1213).
229. See J.T. Shannon Lumber Co. v. Gilco Lumber, Inc., No. 2:07-CV-119, 2008 WL
3833216, at *1 (N.D. Miss. Aug. 14, 2008) (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2703 (2006)); see also Wyatt
v. City of Barre, No. 2:11 CV 297, 2012 WL 3192717, at *6 (D. Vt. Aug. 6, 2012) (citing

Thompson v. Ross, No. 2:10 cy 479, 2010 WL 3896533, at *1-5 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2010)) ("The
court found that once the plaintiff saved the emails to his laptop, they were no longer within a
facility provided by an electronic communication service. In order for there to be a violation of the
SCA, the defendants would have had to view the emails while still in the storage provided by
plaintiffs Internet service provider. Once the plaintiff removed them from his personal email and
downloaded them to his laptop, the SCA no longer applied.").
230. See Crispin,717 F. Supp. 2d at 991.
231. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)-(b)(1) (2006). Although these two categories are treated
differently in the statute, both must disclose data to the person who created it. Id.
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the plaintiff to share the entire contents of her Facebook page with the defendant,
despite holding that Facebook was both a remote computing service and an
electronic computing service and was covered by the SCA.m In so holding, the
court observed: "'The SCA is not a catch-all statute designed to protect the
privacy of stored Internet communications.' Rather, it only applies to the
enumerated entities. [Plaintiff] being neither an [Electronic Communication
Service] nor a [Remote Computing Service], the SCA does not protect her
Facebook profile from discovery."23
At first blush, this would not seem problematic; the court simply treated the
information and data as if it were on the party's own computer.
But there is a
subtle and perplexing problem: users do not actually control the data that these
third-party sites track and store about them, nor do they have any input into how
long they are kept. In other words, there is an end-run around the statute that
threatens users' privacy, yet they do not even have the option of preventing the
end-run by managing or deleting the data (lawfully and before a preservation
duty has arisen) or by controlling what data they create in the first place.
As a result, the SCA should be replaced with a statute that gives individuals
greater control over the information that is saved about them. If the courts
continue to treat personal data on Facebook and other third-party sites as if it is
in a litigant's possession, custody, and control-as was the case in Largent v.
Reed235 then individuals and customers must have the same level of control
over the data held by a third-party as they would if it were on their own laptop or
home computer. Without control, individuals may one day be forced to disclose
information residing with a third party that they had no chance to vet, correct, or
delete. Preserving privacy means preserving a party's right to control and delete
personal data that can be used against them in court.
C. Congress Should Pass a Comprehensive Privacy Statute, Similar to the
2011 Bill Proposedby Senator AcCain and then-SenatorKerry
In April 2011, Senator McCain and then-Senator Kerry proposed a
comprehensive privacy bill. 6 The bill, if passed into law, would have
mandated a method through which individuals could opt out of being tracked,
similar to the do-not-call listm Itrovided that the federal government, through
the FTC, would enforce privacyn
allowing companies to track only the data

232. See Largent, No. 2009-1823, at 12.
233. Id. (quoting Kerr, supra note 223, at 1214).
234. See id.

235. Id.
236. See Press Release, Kerry, McCain Introduce Commercial Privacy (Apr. 12, 201 1),
available at http://www.kerry.sen,ate.gov/press/release/?id=59a56001-5430-4b6d-b476-460040de027b.
237. See "The Commercial Privacy Bills of Rights Act of 2011" Sunnary, http://www.kerry.
senate.gov/inohnedia/doc/Commercial o2OPrivacy%/o2OBill o2Oof'%2ORights%/o2OSummary.pdf
(last
visited Jan. 29, 2013).
238. See id.
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they actually needed.239 Although the bill may be proposed again during the
next session of Congress, the "do-not-track" feature was met with strong
resistance. 240
Senators McCain and Kerry should be lauded for their proposed bill;
however, a truly comprehensive and meaningful privacy statute should go even
further. It should reconcile the sectoral privacy statutes in force and provide a
private cause of action for privacy violations, which, given the limited resources
of the government, will be the only way to ensure true corporate accountability
for individual privacy violations. The statute should also provide detailed
guidance-thus delegating minimal rulemaking power to the agencies
responsible for enforcing it. For all of the reasons set forth above, Congress
should pass an even stronger comprehensive privacy statute that provides the
appropriate enforcement agencies with the power they need to protect the
privacy of the American people. The statute should: (1) create a comprehensive
statute that supersedes all statutes relating to nongovernmental collection, use,
and disclosure of personal data, such as Gramm-Leach-Bliley, HIPAA, and the
Right To Financial Privacy Act; this effort should include replacing the ECPA
and SCA with a statutory scheme to protect all data-not just communications
data-from disclosure absent a valid criminal warrant or an equally compelling
reason; (2) prohibit Internet-activity tracking through the use of cookies,
spyware, and beacons without clear and meaningful consent from the individual
or corporate customer; (3) mandate clear and meaningful disclosures regarding
how and why Internet companies with whom we do business-such as social
networking sites, web-based email providers, and search engines-track and
store our data beJbre a customer signs tip for the services and prohibit any
changes to those policies after the customer has entered into a contractual
relationship with the company; (4) strengthen the law of unconscionability and
empower courts to void consumer contracts that force consumers to waive their
privacy rights in exchange for the goods and services used by all, such as mobile
phone services, Internet, and email; (5) provide access, control, and oversight
with regard to the data tracked and stored about individuals by these giant forprofit corporations; (6) provide a private right of action and a right to proceed as
a class action plaintiff for statutory privacy violations; and (7) allow for
presumed statutory damages for each violation of the statute.
Without a comprehensive "Privacy Bill of Rights," as Senators McCain and
Kerry called it, we may extinguish the actual Bill of Rights and put the
government as well as the largest corporations in the world in a position to easily
reach and control tis with a mere keystroke.

239. See id.
240. See Gabriel Pema, Privacy Advocates Say MlcCain Kerry Bill Falls Short, CONSLTMER
WATCHDOG (Apr. 13, 2011), http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/story/privacy-advocates-say-mecainkery-bill-falls-short.
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D. In 4ddition, the Judicial Conference of the United States and the
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure Should Propose
Amendments to the FederalRules of Civil Procedure to Account for the
Discoverabilityoflnadvertently Shared Online Information in Litigation
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should once again be amended to
account for "private" electronically stored information (ESI). As the discovery
rules currently stand, a litigant is entitled to discover EST relating to anT
"nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense."2
Furthermore, discovery provisions "are to be applied as broadly and liberally as
possible."24 2 This means that information stored on iPads, iPhones, OnStar,
cloud servers, Google, and Facebook that consumers give voluntarily, as well as
information such as IP addresses and shopping proclivities that consumers may
give involuntarily, is discoverable if relevant.2
However, as discussed above, much of this information was created by third
parties. Further, huge seas of data about us have been shared or created without
our knowledge.244 This EST is far different from the journal entry written in
Microsoft Word and stored on a personal hard drive; instead, this is the evergrowing volume of highly personal information stored on third-party
computers.245 Thus, in litigation, it should not be deemed discoverable in the
same sense as a document created by the litigant itself-especially when the
litigant was not even aware it existed.
Thus, the Judicial Conference of the United States, through the Committee
on Rules of Practice and Procedure, should implement a contemporary discovery
rule that addresses the tension between broad discoverability and the threat to
individual privacy in this digital age. This rule, or amendments to Rules 26 and
45, should provide that EST involuntarily collected by a third party or
unknowingly shared with a third party shall only be discovered from the litigant
itself, i.e., the party that holds the right to privacy, and not through a third-party
request or subpoena intended to circumvent those rights. Additionally, the rule
should create a presumption that EST involuntarily collected by a third party or
unknowingly shared with a third party is "not reasonably accessible" 246 and thus
be subject to the same procedures and safeguards set forth in Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 26(b)(2)(B). The rule should further enlarge the definition of
"not reasonably accessible" in Rule 26(b)(2)(B) 247 and require courts to consider

241. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(i).

242. Hickinan v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 506 (1947).
243. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); see also Largent v. Reed, No. 2009-1823, 2011 WL

5632688 (Pa. Ct. Corn. P1. Nov. 8, 2011) (holding that a litigant's Facebook profile was subject to
discovery).
244.
245.
246.
247.

See Roos, supra note 98.
See id.
FED. R. Ci. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
Id.
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the responding parties claims of privacy-perhaps through a balancing test
similar to that described in Federal Rule of Evidence 403 -before allowing
discovery of such materials. The rule should also take into account a litigant's
privacy settings on social networking web sites to determine whether the
information was intentionally placed on the Internet with unlimited or restricted
third-party access and provide methods for a litigant to protect private
information. Specifically, the rule should provide a litigant with a per se
presumption that information shared with a vendor or third party according to a
"privacy policy" or terms and conditions purporting to afford them some right to
privacy is entitled to protection from public disclosure through a protective order
sealing or segregating private information.
Given that almost all relevant, nonprivileged ESI is discoverable in
litigation249 and given that individual litigants no longer control their own ESI,
only a discovery rule granting litigants some mechanism for protecting their
unintentionally and unknowingly shared private and confidential information can
prevent the further deterioration of the once fundamental right to privacy.
V.

CONCLUSION

There is an ever-widening gap between each American citizen's expectation
of privacy and the ease with which each citizen's personal information can be
accessed using modern technology. Given that Google, Facebook, and the other
Internet giants are determined to profit from sharing citizens' data with the world
and given the ineffective patchwork of existing federal privacy statutes and the
slow and inconsistent progression of the judicial opinions on the subject,
Congress should act now to pass a comprehensive privacy bill before it is too
late. The Judicial Conference of the United States should act to limit the
discoverability of that private information in litigation. By failing to act as a
nation, we could create the very Orwellian nightmare that many fear.

248. FED. R. EVID. 403.

249. See Derek S. Witte, Your Opponent Does Not Need a Friend Request to See Your Page:
Social Networking Sites and Electronic Discovery, 41 McGEORGE L. REV. 891, 892-93 (2010)
(citing FED. R. Civ. P. 34(a)(1)) (explaining that the contents of social networking pages-such as a
Facebook page-are ESI under the plain meaning as defined by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure).
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